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FILLING IN THE GAPS OF VIRGINIA BAIL REFORM
R. Bryan Hatchett*
I

INTRODUCTION

The 1960's and early 1970's witnessed an unprecedented reform
of the bail laws of this country.1 The reform has made it possible
for a greater percentage of criminal defendants to be released
before trial2 thereby avoiding the stigma and considerable
prejudice flowing from incarceration.3 Even though the reform has
also produced a modest increase in the number of persons who fail
to appear for trial,4 on balance critical response to the reform has
been favorable.
The question of whether a person accused of a crime should be
admitted to bail arises shortly after arrest, 5 and may be considered
again by appropriate judges as the case winds its way through the
* Attorney, CBS, Inc. and member, Virginia State Bar. B.A., Washington and Lee University, 1973; J.D., University or Richmond, 1977.
1. W. THOMAS, BAn.

REFORM IN AMERICA

3 (1976) [hereinafter cited as

THOMAS];

Ervin,

The Legislative Role in Bail Reform, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Ervin].
2. Probably the most elaborate attempt to measure the results of the nationwide bail
reform was made by Prof. Wayne H. Thomas, Jr. He conducted a survey of twenty cities
(none in Virginia) comparing the release figures of 1962 with the release figures of 1971. He
concluded that the proportion of felony defendants released before trial rose from 50% to
65%. THOMAS, supra note 1, at 252. For misdemeanor cases, the proportion of defendants
released before trial increased from 60% to 70%. Id. At the same time, the percentage of
defendants failing to appear at trial rose from 6% to 10%. Id. at 253. Prof. Thomas concluded that the general increase in the percentage of defendants released prior to trial is
directly attributable to the reform's success at encouraging the use of nonfinancial release
conditions. Furthermore, in Prof. Thomas's opinion, "[t]he long-term use of nonfinancial
releases appears assured" notwithstanding the rise in the failure to appear rate. Id.
3. The prejudice suffered by an accused person who is incarcerated for a prolonged period
of time prior to trial goes beyond the loss of personal dignity. Incarceration takes an accused
away from his job, jeopardizes his marital and family relationships, and limits his ability to
locate favorable witnesses. Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail (pts 1 & 2), 113
U. PA. L. REv. 959, 1125, 1137-48 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Foote]. Some authorities argue
that an accused person, not released prior to trial, will more likely be convicted and more
likely receive a harsher sentence than a similarly situated accused person who is released.
Rankin, The Effect of PretrialDetention, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 641 (1964); Note, Preventive
Detention-An Empirical Analysis, 6 HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 291, 347 (1971). See also,
Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521, 530-32 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
4. See note 2 supra, and note 24 infra.
5. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-80 (Repl. Vol. 1975); VA. Sup. CT. R. 3A:5(a).
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court process.' Each bail determination involves a two-part decision: (1) should the accused person be granted release, and (2) if
so, what condition or conditions should be imposed. Reformers focused on the latter issue, advocating alternatives to the traditional
practice of conditioning release on the execution of a bail bond or
the deposit of cash of property in the full amount of the bail set by
the judge. The three principal reform plans called for: (1) release
of the accused upon his personal recognizance or unsecured promise to appear,7 (2) release in exchange for a cash deposit of ten
percent of the bail amount, and (3) release subject to one or more
nonfinancial conditions such as being placed in the custody of a
responsible person or organization. 8
Because of the reform's emphasis on alternatives to traditional
release methods, it has expanded the definition of "bal" beyond
the common law sense of release secured by surety9 to encompass
any release regardless of the type of condition imposed. It is clearly
in the newer expanded sense that "bail" appears in the title of the
federal Bail Reform Act of 1966 (Act). 10 The Act authorizes all
three of the major reform techniques, and is generally regarded as
the most important legislation to come out of the bail reform era.1"
Virginia's release statutes, enacted during the early and mid-seven6.

VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-124 to .2-125, .2-130, .2-132, .2-319 (Cum. Supp. 1979); VA. CODE

19.2-133 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
7. "Personal bond [another name for an unsecured promise to appear] is a promise to pay
a specified sum in the event of nonappearance. Personal recognizance is a promise, without
ANN. §

a monetary penalty, to appear. Unlike conventional bail bond, neither entails a cash deposit." United States v. Stanley, 469 F.2d 576, 579, n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1972), citing D. FREED &
P. WALD, BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES: 1964 at 61-62 (Report to the National Conference on
Bail and Criminal Justice, 1964) [hereinafter cited as FREED & WALD].
8. See notes 14-15, 20 and 33 infra and accompanying text. Other recent reforms designed
to reduce the incarcerated pretrial population include the greater use of summonses rather
than arrest warrants (the summoned person makes his promise to appear where he is apprehended rather than at the police station before a magistrate) and the greater use of diversion projects (commonly the projects are designed for drug offenders). THOMAS, supra note
1, at 200-10, 224-26.
9. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 127 (5th ed. 1979). "Bail" will be used in both the strict and
the modern expanded sense in this article. The particular meaning should be clear from the
context.
10. Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214 (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-3147, 3149-3151
(1976); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3148, 3156 (Cum. Supp. 1979). See Ervin, supra note 1, at 440; Wald &
Freed, The Bail Reform Act of 1966: A Practitioner'sPrimer, 52 A.B.A.J. 940 (1966).
11. THOMAS, supra note 1, at 161.
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ties, and the corresponding rule of court are closely modeled on the
federal reform. However, the principal new statutes and the rule
have received no published interpretation by the Supreme Court of
Virginia. 12 There is little or no guidance in Virginia defining: the
defense counsel's role in seeking release for his client; the rules of
evidence to be observed in release hearings; the information to include in filing an appeal; and the appellate court's function in reviewing motions for release. This article will summarize the federal
developments in these areas, concentrating on pretrial release,
rather than the related area of release pending sentencing or appeal, and will recommend whether the federal practices should be
adopted for use in Virginia proceedings.1 3
Because the change in federal and Virginia statutory bail law has
been so substantial, it is necessary to begin with a background
summary of the reform movement itself, giving particular attention
to the 1966 Act. Next, the principal constitutional questions respecting release on bail will be briefly discussed followed by an account of how the reform changed Virginia law. Finally, this article
will consider aspects of federal release law pertaining to matters on
which Virginia law is silent, with emphasis on whether or not the
federal practices also should be followed in Virginia proceedings.
12. [Tjhe Court does not receive a great number of requests to set or reduce bond. Rulings on requests in the form of a motion do not appear in the Virginia Reports. However, if the request is properly filed, that is in the form of a petition for writ of error,
a refusal by this Court will be published in the Reports in the section "Appeals and
Writs of Error Refused." If the Court grants relief, this will not appear in the Reports
unless a written opinion is handed down.
Letter from David B. Beach, Deputy Clerk, Supreme Court of Virginia, to the author (January 23, 1980).
13. It should be noted at the outset that, aside from the many similarities shared by
federal and Virginia release law, the federal test for release eligibility allows for release in
situations where the Virginia test does not. This difference will be touched on; however, no
opinion preferring one test over the other will be offered. The debate over which of the two
tests better balances the accused's interest in maintaining his freedom against society's interest in assuring that the accused appears for trial and commits no crimes during the interim has already received extensive attention. See note 67 infra. Instead, we shall take the
Virginia test as we find it and concentrate on recommending procedures for its expeditious
administration consistent with due process.
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II THE BAIL REFORM MOVEMENT

A.

The Manhattan Bail Project

In 1961 industrialist Louis Schweitzer, alarmed at overcrowded
New York City jails, funded a plan known as the Manhattan Bail
Project to post bail for city defendants too poor to obtain release
through other channels. 14 Originally, the project was to provide a
revolving bail fund, but was later transformed into a program of
interviews to determine each detained pretrial defendant's stability and community roots. If certain criteria were met, the project
staff would recommend to the judge that the defendant be released
on his own recognizance, that is, based on the defendant's bare
promise to return for trial without posting bond or making any
other financial obligation.15 In its first year of operation four times
as many pretrial defendants obtained release on recognizance than
would have received it had the judge not reviewed the project's
reports and recommendations."" Only three released persons failed
to appear for trial.17 The project was praised for demonstrating the
feasibility of divorcing pretrial release from traditional financial requirements while still assuring the appearance of the released person for trial.1 8 According to recent figures, seventy bail projects
modeled on the Manhattan Bail Project now operate in scattered
communities all across the country, though none of them are in
Virginia.1 9
B. Ten Percent Deposit Plans
Another approach designed to make pretrial release more readily
accessible began in Illinois. In 1963, the state legislature authorized
14. Ares, Rankin & Sturz, The Manhattan Bail Project: An Interim Report on the Use of
Pre-TrialParole, 38 N.Y.U. L. REv. 67, n.7 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Ares]. The Manhattan Bail Project was the first undertaking of the Vera Foundation, started by Schweitzer,
and now operating as the Vera Institute of Justice. THOMAS, supra note 1, at 3-4.
15. THOMAS, supra note 1, at 20.
16. Ares, supra note 14, at 86. This estimate is based on the clinical survey by the Manhattan Bail Project. Id.
17. Id.
18. N. Y. Times, June 19, 1962, at 34, col. 2.
19. This figure was obtained by counting the pretrial release programs listed in The 1978
Directory of Pretrial Services, which is available from the Pretrial Resource Center, Washington, D.C.
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the pretrial release of defendants who deposited with the court ten
percent of the bond amount set as a condition of release. If the
defendant appeared for trial, the entire deposit, save a small service fee, would be returned. 20 The Illinois Ten Percent Deposit
Plan was enacted in response to a bail bond scandal in Chicago,
and was designed to dry up the market for commercial bondsmen
who regularly charge a fee of ten percent of the bond amount-a
fee never returned to the defendant.2 1 Similar ten percent deposit
plans have been enacted in thirteen other states 22 and also included in the 1966 federal reform.23
C. The Bail Reform Act of 1966
The federal Act of 1966 reformed the release procedure for all
defendants accused of non-military federal crimes, 24 and has since
served as the model for the reforms enacted in at least eighteen
states.25 The Act's principal innovation is the express duty it imposes on judicial officers (the Act's generic description for persons
authorized to grant release 26 ) to favor conditions of release which
inflict the least financial burden on the defendant. The Act also
incorporates the earlier reforms pioneered by the Manhattan Bail
Project and the Illinois Ten Percent Deposit Plan.
The Act distinguishes between persons accused of capital crimes
and persons accused of noncapital crimes. In noncapital cases, the
20. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-7 (Smith-Hurd) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
21. FREED & WALD, supra note 7, at 30.
22. THOMAS, supra note 1, at 187.

23. 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(3) (1976).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(2) (Supp. 1977). For a statistical analysis of federal release practices before and after enactment of the 1966 Act, see JUDICIAL COUNCIL COMMITTEE TO STUDY
THE OPERATION OF THE BAIL REFORM ACT IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Report 46 (1968),
reprinted in Hearings on S.2600 before the Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,91st Cong., 2d Sess. 522 (1970). See also THOMAS, supra note
1, at 165. Criticism of federal release practice under the Act has focused on the sometimes
uneven application given it by different judges rather than the reform concepts themselves.
COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPOIiT TO THE CONGRESS BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL: THE FEDERAL BAIL PROCESS FOSTERS INEQUITIES (Oct. 17, 1978).
25. THOMAS, supra note 1, at 27. The states are: Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware,

Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia and Wyoming. Id.
26. 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(1) (Supp. 1977).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a) (1976).
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defendant "shall . . . be ordered released pending trial."2

Not-

withstanding this explicit guarantee that some form of release will
be offered to all defendants charged with noncapital crimes, subsequent case law has interpreted the Act as not depriving the judicial
officer of his inherent authority to deny release where there is
strong evidence that the defendant will likely injure a potential
witness or juror.29 On the other hand, the judicial officer has no
authority to deny pretrial release in a noncapital case where the
defendant's freedom would only constitute a general danger to the
community at large.30 After considering an extraordinary factual
situation one court recently held that this inherent authority also
includes the authority to deny pretrial release in a noncapital case
if it is nearly certain that no set of release conditions will prevent
the defendant from attempting to flee. 31
The judicial officer ruling on pretrial release in a noncapital case
is required first to consider allowing release upon "personal recognizance or upon the execution of an unsecured appearance bond in
an amount specified by the judicial officer." 32 If, "in an exercise of
his discretion," the judicial officer finds that these forms of release
will not "reasonably assure the appearance of the person for trial,"
he may consider other alternatives.3 The conditions imposing the
28. Id.
29. United States v. Wind, 527 F.2d 672 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. Gilbert, 425
F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Both Wind and Gilbert were remanded for further hearings to
determine the actual danger involved.
30. United States v. Bigelow, 544 F.2d 904, 907 (6th Cir. 1976). See United States v.
Leathers, 412 F.2d 169, 171 (D.C. Cir. 1969); H. R. REP. No. 1541, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 6,
reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2293, 2296; see also Ervin, supra note 1,
at 443.
31. United States v. Abrahams, 447 F. Supp. 395 (D. Mass), aff'd, 575 F.2d 3 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied 439 U.S. 821 (1978). The defendant in Abrahams was an escapee from a state
prison, had given false information at the release hearing, had failed to appear eight days
later thereby defaulting on a $100,000 cash bond, and had recently transferred $1.5 million
to Bermuda. 575 F.2d at 4-5.
32. U.S.C. § 3146(a) (1976). See note 7 supra.
33. The conditions, in order of preference, are:
(1) place the person in the custody of a designated person or organization agreeing to supervise him;
(2) place restriction in the travel, association, or place of abode of the person during the period of release;
(3) require the execution of an appearance bond in a specified amount and the
deposit in the registry of the court, in cash or other security as directed, of a sum not
to exceed 10 per centum of the amount of the bond, such deposit to be returned upon
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greatest financial hardship are reserved until other have been considered and rejected. If no single condition provides the requisite
assurance of appearance, the judicial officer may fashion a combination of conditions that will.3 4 It has been repeatedly held that
the Act's sole purpose in conditioning pretrial release in noncapital
cases is to reduce the likelihood of flight. Therefore, the accused's
potential danger to the community is not a proper basis for imposing further release conditions. 8
A defendant accused of a capital crime who seeks pretrial release
is accorded the same treatment given to a defendant 'in a noncapital case "unless the court or judge has reason to believe that no
one or more conditions of release will reasonably assure that the
person will not flee or pose a danger to any other person or to the
community. ' 36 In such cases, the Act clearly provides that release
be denied.37 Any defendant, regardless of the crime charged
against him, who is denied release or is unable to meet the specific
conditions attached to his release, is entitled to have his case reviewed by judicial officers of succeedingly higher authority."
the performance of the conditions of release;
(4) require the execution of a bail bond with sufficient solvent sureties, or the
deposit of cash in lieu thereof; or
(5) impose any other condition deemed reasonably necessary to assure appearance
as required, including a condition requiring that the person return to custody after
specified hours.
18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(1)-(5) (1976).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a) (1976). In determining which conditions of release to impose, the
Act instructs the judicial officer to consider
The nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of the evidence
against the accused, the accused's family ties, employment, financial resources, character and mental condition, the length of his residence in the community, his record
of convictions, and his record of appearance at court proceedings or of flight to avoid
prosecution or failure to appear at court proceedings.
18 U.S.C. § 3146(b) (1976).
35. See, e.g., United States v. Leathers, 412 F.2d 169, 171 (D.C. Cir. 1969). But see United
States v. Melville, 306 F. Supp. 124, 126-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), where Judge Frankel suggested
that the two purposes cannot be completely separated from one another:
[W]hile "danger to any other person or to the community" is not in itself a proper
consideration for pretrial bail in a noncapital case, we doubt that a defendant's powerful disposition to incur further criminal liabilities could be ignored utterly in judging what will "reasonably assure" his appearance for trial.
36. 18 U.S.C. § 3148 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
37. Id.
38. 18 U.S.C. § 3146(d) (1976); FED. R. APP. P. 9.
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CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

The Eighth Amendment

Curiously, the eighth amendment,3 9 the only amendment to the
Constitution expressly mentioning bail, has figured only slightly in
the development of the country's bail law. The amendment proscribes the imposition of "excessive bail," but does not expressly
prohibit the absolute denial of release where the court declines to
set bail in any amount. The Supreme Court avoided confronting
the amendment's internal inconsistency until 1952, when it decided Carlson v. Landon.4 0 The case concerned aliens accused of
being members of the Communist Party. They challenged the government's right to detain them without bail pending deportation
hearings. In rejecting the aliens' reliance on the eighth amendment, the Court ruled that the amendment did not prohibit Congress from identifying classes of nonbailable crimes. 1 Critics of the
decision have complained that its treatment of the eighth amendment is merely dictum and based on a misreading of history.42
They also criticize Carlson for being at odds with Stack v. Boyle,4
decided that same term.44 Stack held that a federal trial court disregarded the eighth amendment by seting bail higher than was reasonable to assure that the accused would later appear for trial.45
Also according to Stack, when bail is unusually high, it must be
supported by record evidence." While it may be that the logic of
Carlson and Stack are in conflict, their literal holdings are not;
Carlson addresses denial of bail and Stack addresses excessive
bail. Therefore, with near unanimity, lower federal courts have accepted the assertion in Carlson that the eighth amendment grants
39. "Excessive bail shall not be required .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
40. 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
41. Id. at 545.
42. Foote, supra note 3, at 979-89; Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in
the World of John Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REv. 371, 403 (1970).
43. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
44. E.g., Tribe, supra note 42, at 403-04.
45. The defendants in Stack were charged with violating the Smith Act, ch. 439, 54 Stat.
670-671 (1940) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1976)), which carried a maximum penalty of five years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. Bail for each of the twelve defendants
was set at $50,000. 342 U.S. at 3.
46. 342 U.S. at 6.
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no constitutional right to release.4 7

The effect of these interpretations of the eighth amendment on
state proceedings is unclear because the Supreme Court has never
held the excessive bail clause to be enforceable against the states
as a protection incorporated by the fourteenth amendment.48 Fortunately, since most state constitutions grant defendants greater
rights than those afforded by Carlson, the uncertainties surrounding the eighth amendment are often academic. 49 Virginia, however,
is in the minority. In fact, the excessive bail proscription enacted
in Virginia's first constitution"0 and repeated in the present constitution 51 was the model for the draftsmen of the eighth
amendment. 2
B.

Griffin v. Illinois

The Supreme Court's decision in Griffin v. Illinois,5 s although
not directly involving bail, has had a much more discernible effect
on bail reform than either Carlson or Stack. In Griffin, the Court
interpreted the fourteenth amendment as requiring the state of I147. See, e.g., Wansley v. Wilkerson, 263 F. Supp. 54, 57 (W.D. Va. 1967). See Duker, The
Right to Bail: A Historical Inquiry, 42 ALB. L. REv. 33, 89 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Duker].
48. See Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971). The Supreme Court has approved the
incorporation of the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause into the
fourteenth amendment. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). The absence of
direct authority from the Supreme Court has not prevented numerous lower courts from
holding the bail clause enforceable against the states. E.g., Arsad v. Henry, 317 F. Supp. 129
(E.D.N.C. 1970); Goodine v. Griffin, 309 F. Supp. 590, 591 (S.D. Ga. 1970); Wansley v. Wilkerson, 263 F. Supp. 54, 56 (W.D. Va. 1967).
49. According to a summary of state bail laws by Duker, supra note 47, at 93 n.373, fortytwo states grant a. right to pretrial release if the accused is charged with a noncapital
offense.
50. The Virginia Declaration of Rights, art. 9, reprinted in 9 W. HENING, STATUTES AT
LARGE OF VIRGINIA 111 (1821).
51. VA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
52. The excessive bail clause of the eighth amendment, ratified in 1791, is all but identical
to the Virginia Declaration of Rights, clause nine, which reads: "Excessive bail ought not to
be required .... The Virginia Declaration of Rights was drafted by George Mason and

enacted by the Virginia Constitutional Convention in 1776. 1

PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON,

1725-1792, at 286 (R. Rutland ed. 1970). Mason borrowed the phrase from the English Bill
of Rights of 1689. 1 W.&M., Sess. 2, c.2. See generally 1 A. HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA

at 982-88.
53. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).

150-51 (1974); Duker, supra note 47, at 66; Foote, supra note 2,
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linois to supply a convicted, indigent defendant with either a full
transcript or an adequate substitute as an incident of the right to
full appellate review.5 4 Dissenting Justices Burton and Minton,
alarmed at the possible consequences of the majority's position,
asked rhetorically, "[W]hy fix bail at any reasonable sum if a poor
man can't make .it?" 55 Almost as if the irony intended by the dissenting justices had gone unrecognized, federal authorities 6 and
law review commentators 57 began advocating an extension of Griffin which would invalidate the setting of bail in any amount beyond the accused's ability to pay.
The 1966 Act and similar state reforms 5 reflect this concern,
and have succeeded in reducing the number of release cases in
which the Griffin argument can be raised. The Act lists a hierarchy
of possible restrictions on release, of which the requirement of a
ten percent cash deposit and the execution of a bail bond are numbered third and fourth, respectively.5 9 Therefore, these financial
release conditions are statutorily permissible only if the preceding
nonfinancial restrictions have been found inadequate.6 0
C.

Preventive Detention

Preventive detention is the name commonly given to the practice of denying release to prevent the commission of a future crime
rather than to ensure appearance at trial. The long standing practice has been to restrict its use to persons charged with capital
crimes, convicted persons awaiting sentencing or appeal, or, as pre54. Id. at 19-20.
55. Id. at 29 (Burton and Minton, JJ., dissenting).
56. Bandy v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 197, 198 (1960) (Douglas, Circuit Justice);

ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S COMM. ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, RE-

PORT: POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 85-86

(1963).

57. Foote, supra note 3, at 1151-64; Paulsen, Pre-TrialRelease in the United States, 66
COLUM. L. REV. 109, 119-22 (1966).
58. See note 25, supra.
59. 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a) (1976).
60. Apart from the Griffin argument discussed in the text, the fourteenth amendment has
often been invoked by defendants seeking release as a guarantee against an arbitrary release
determination. However, because of the abundant discretion normally afforded judges in
release matters, reviewing courts rarely interpret release determinations as being arbitrary.
See, e.g., Bowring v. Cox, 334 F. Supp. 334 (W.D. Va. 1971); Wilborn v. Peyton, 287 F.
Supp. 787 (W.D. Va. 1968); Wansley v. Wilkerson, 263 F. Supp. 54 (W.D. Va. 1967). But see
notes 138-39 infra and accompanying text.
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viously mentioned, accused persons who, if released, will likely injure a potential witness or juror. The 1966 Act, continuing a federal policy begun in 1789, authorizes preventive detention only in
these limited situations-." All but the most vehement detractors of
preventive detention agree that when so limited and not arbitrarily
imposed, it is a constitutionally permitted exercise of state or federal authority. 2
In 1969, the Nixon administration, as part of its pledge to restore "law and order," 63 sided with critics of the 1966 Act who proposed expanding the availability of preventive detention to include
any noncapital case where there is evidence of danger to the community. 64 Eventually, unable to get support for its original proposal, the administration lowered its sights and substituted a bill
changing only the District of Columbia's release law.6 5
The numerous scholarly articles spawned by the Congressional
debate and passage of the new District of Columbia bail law66 bear
witness that opinion is sharply divided over the constitutionality of
preventive detention except as authorized by case law interpreting
the 1966 Act.6 7 Those opposed to expanding the use of preventive
detention argue that all persons charged with noncapital crimes
have a right to pretrial release guaranteed by the eighth amend61. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 91. See notes 28-31 supra, and accompanying
text.
62. Foote, supra note 3, at 1181.
63. See generally J. McGINNISS, THE SELLING OF THE PRESIDENT 1968, at 11-20 (1969).
64. 27 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 238, Feb. 7, 1969 (Pres. Nixon's Jan. 31, 1969 statement on
crime control).
65. For a summary of the political maneuverings behind the proposal, see Borman, The
Selling of Preventive Detention 1970, 65 Nw. U. L. REV. 879, 881-82 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Borman].
66. The District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 91358, 84 Stat. 473 (codified in D. C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1321 to -1332 (1973)).
67. Borman, supra note 65; Dershowitz, Imprisonment by Judicial Hunch, 57 A.B.A.J.

560 (1971); Ervin, Forward:Preventive Detention-A Step Backward for Criminal Justice,
6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289 (1971); Hess, PretrialDetention and the 1970 District of
Columbia Crime Act-The Next Step in Bail Reform, 37 BROOKLYN L. REV. 277 (1971);
Hruska, Preventive Detention: The Constitution and Congress, 3 CREIGHTON L. REV. 36
(1970); Miller, Preventive Detention-A Guide to the Eradicationof IndividualRights, 16
How. L. J. 1 (1970); Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of PretrialDetention,
55 VA. L. REV. 1223 (1969); Portman, "To Detain or not to Detain?"-A Review of the
Background, Current Proposals,and Debate on Preventive Detention, 10 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 224 (1970); Tribe, supra note 42.
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ment.6 8 It is also maintained that the concept of due process, 9 particularly as it encompasses the presumption of innocence, 0 imposes a similar guarantee. Finally they argue that the District of
Columbia bail law violates both the equal protection and due process guarantees by withholding freedom to a broad class of persons
even though statistical evidence indicates that only a small percentage of this class would in fact commit acts of violence if left at
large.

71

In response to those criticisms, defenders of the increased use of
preventive detention argue that the eighth amendment, as interpreted by Cartson, does not grant a right to release;7 2 nor is due
process violated where society's need for protection outweighs the

accused's interest in freedom.73 They also argue that the presumption of innocence is merely an evidentiary rule,7 4 and that all re7
lease determinations involve uncertain predictions.
Partially because of the controversy surrounding preventive de-

tention, District of Columbia prosecutors have used their expanded
powers sparingly,76 and there is still no reported case ruling on the

constitutionality of the main features of the District's law.77 As will
68. Borman, supra note 65, at 901-03; Miller, supra note 67, at 8-10; Portman, supra note
67, at 242-44; Tribe, supra note 42 at 396-406.
69. Borman, supra note 65, at 903-13; Miller, supra note 67, at 10-15; Portman, supra
note 67, at 244-49; Tribe, supra note 42, at 381-96.
70. Miller, supra note 67, at 15-17; Portman, supra note 67, at 244-46; Tribe, supra note
42, at 403-05.
71. Borman, supra note 65, at 896-901; Dershowitz, supra note 67, at 562; Portman, supra
note 67, at 249-55. See generally THOMAS, supra note 1, at 234-40.
72. Hess, supra note 67, at 312; Hruska, supra note 67, at 42-48; Mitchell, supra note 67,
at 1232.
73. Hess, supra note 67, at 314-19; Hruska, supra note 67, at 48-57; Mitchell, supra note
67, at 1232.
74. Hruska, supra note 67, at 49-50; Mitchell, supra note 67, at 1231-32.
75. Hess, supra note 67, at 317-18; Mitchell, supra note 67, at 1239-42.
76. Report of the D.C. Bail Agency, for the Period Jan. 1, 1977-Dec. 31, 1977, at 7 (no
publication date given); N. BASES & W. McDONALD, PREVENTIVE DETENTION IN THE DisTRiCr
OF COLUMBIA: THE FIRST TEN MONTHS 89 (1972).
77. See Dash v. Mitchell, 356 F. Supp. 1292 (D.D.C.), aff'd mem. sub. nor. Briscoe v.
Kliendienst, 408 U.S. 808 (1972) (constitutional challenge dismissed due to mootness, lack
of standing, and the issue not being ripe for review). See also United States v. Thompson,
452 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 998 (1972) (limiting the application of
the D.C. bail law to defendants charged with violating local D.C. laws rather than any federal crime allegedly committed in the District of Columbia).
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be evident from the discussion of Virginia release law to follow, the
Virginia policy of preventive detention is basically the same as the
District of Columbia's and therefore subject to the same constitutional challenges.
IV.

REFORM IN VIRGINIA

Reform of pretrial release in Virginia evolved in three stages.
The first two stages, the adoption by the Supreme Court of Virginia of rule 3A:29,7 1 effective in 1972, and the enactment of legislation by the Virginia General Assembly"9 in 1973, borrowed features from the 1966 federal Act. The third stage, part of the
comprehensive 1975 revision of all Virginia criminal procedure,80
actually added nothing novel to the procedure already established
in 1972 and 1973. It did, however, regroup these reforms into one
chapter of the code.
A.

1972: Rule 3A:29

Rule 3A:29 was part of a package of criminal procedure rules for
circuit and district courts drafted by a committee of the Virginia
Bar Association and adopted by the Supreme Court of Virginia.",
The rules were generally patterned after the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, 82 and were not intended to supersede existing
statutory law as much as to clarify and supplement it.83 Rule 3A:29
establishes a standard for release on bail. While "bail" is not defined by the rule, it is clear from its context that the drafters intended "bail" to carry the traditional common law meaning of release secured by surety.8 4 The rule provides that any person in
78.
79.
80.
81.

VA. Sup. CT. R. 3A:29.

1973 Va. Acts ch. 485.
1975 Va. Acts ch. 495.
The court adopted the rules but not the accompanying comments supplied by the
drafting committee. JOINT COMMITTEE ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, VIRGINIA STATE
BAR AND VIRGINIA BAR ASSOCIATION, DEFENDING CRIMINAL CASES IN VIRGINIA, at A-i (P.
Manson ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as DEFENDING CRIMINAL CASES IN VIRGINIA].
82. FED. R. CRIM. P. 46 is the federal rule covering pretrial release. It was amended in
1972 to conform to the 1966 federal bail reform. FED. R. CRIM. P. 46, Advisory Committee
Note.
83. VA. Sup. CT. R. 3A:1, Drafting Committee Comment, reprinted in DEFENDING CRIMINAL CASES IN VIRGINIA, supra note 81, at A-2.
84. Subsection (e) of the rule authorizes release other than release secured by bail, but
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custody pending trial shall be admitted to bail unless there is
probable cause that "(1) he will not appear for trial... or (2) his
liberty will constitute an unreasonable danger to the public." 85
This standard, which does not distinguish between persons accused of capital crimes and those accused of noncapital crimes, imposes approximately the same test for release that the federal law
sets forth as the test in capital cases. 88 By comparison to Virginia
rule 3A:29, the federal law governing noncapital cases clearly favors release in two distinct respects. The federal courts may deny
pretrial release in noncapital cases on the ground of preventing a
future crime only when there is strong evidence that the accused's
liberty threatens the safety of a potential witness or juror in the
defendant's trial.87 The drafters of the Virginia rule rejected the
federal policy as inevitably encouraging sub rosa preventive detention in the form of setting bail at extremely high amounts. 8 Secondly, the 1966 Act only recently has been interpreted to allow the
denial of release to prevent flight in a noncapital case.8 9 In that
case, the court took great pains to emphasize that the denial was in
response to "extreme and unusual circumstances" indicating overwhelmingly that flight was all but certain. 0 Rule 3A:29, on the
other hand, provides that release can be denied upon a probable
cause showing that flight is likely which, on its face at least, imposes a lesser standard of proof.
When a determination has been made to release the accused,
rule 3A:29 lists the factors to be considered in fashioning the terms
of bail."1 Finally, the rule provides a right of appeal to persons deprovides no test for determining when these other release forms are appropriate. VA. Sup.
CT. R. 3A:29(e).

85. VA. Sup. CT. R. 3A:29(a). Virginia bail law prior to the adoption of rule 3A:29 was
largely undeveloped. See generally 2B MICHIE'S JuRis. Bail and Recognizance § 8 (1970).
86. 18 U.S.C. § 3148 (1976).
87. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
88. VA. SuP. CT. R. 3A:29, Drafting Committee Comment, reprinted in DEFENDING CmMNAL CASES IN VIRGINIA, supra note 81, at A-43. See note 35, sulra.
89. United States v. Abrahams, 575 F.2d 3 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978).
90. 575 F.2d at 8. See note 31 supra.
91. "(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense, (2) the weight of the evidence, (3)
the financial ability to pay bail, and (4) the character of the accused." VA. SuP. CT. R.
3A:29(b).
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nied bail or burdened with excessive bail.92 Both of these features
closely follow the language of the federal Act.9
B.

1973: Legislation

The 1973 legislation created the first Virginia release laws expressly to favor the unsecured pretrial release of criminal defendants.9 4 Of course, this concept was the very heart of the 1966 federal reform.9 5 Like the federal provision, the 1973 legislation
authorizes the judicial officer, 96 in noncapital cases, to consider releasing the accused either on his written promise to appear or upon
an unsecured bond.97 The legislation lists factors for the judicial
officer to consider in making this determination. 8 If the judicial
officer determines that such release would "not reasonably assure
the appearance of the accused as required," then the legislation
instructs the judicial officer to impose one or more conditions of
release.9 9 These conditions are the same financial and nonfinancial
conditions appearing in the federal reform with the single exception that no ten percent bail deposit is authorized.10 0
The 1973 legislation affords a person accused of a capital crime
the same opportunities for release afforded a defendant in a noncapital case unless the judicial officer has reason to believe that no
conditions of release would provide sufficient assurance against
92. VA. Sup. CT. R. 3A:29(e).
93. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146(b), (d), 3147 (1976).
94. 1973 Va. Acts ch. 485. The legislation enacted new statutes, codified as VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 19.2-122 to -130, and amended or repealed numerous preexisting statutes to conform to
the new language. Id. See also Note, Eighteenth Annual Survey of Developments in Virginia Law: 1972-1973, 59 VA. L. REv. 1400, 1514-16 (1973).
95. 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1976).
96. "Judicial officer," in the Virginia legislation, is the generic description for all persons
authorized to hear requests for release just as it is in the federal law. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2119 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
97. 1973 Va. Acts ch. 485 (§ 19.1-109.2(a)) (current version at VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2123(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979)). See note 7 supra.
98. Id. The factors were taken verbatim from the federal reform, 18 U.S.C. § 3146(b)
(1976). See note 34 supra.The factors are different in only minor respects from the factors
listed in VA. Sup. CT. R. 3A:29(b). See note 91 supra.
99. 1973 Va. Acts Ch. 485 (§ 19.1-109.2(a)) (current version at VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2123(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979)).
100. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
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flight and danger to the community.101 Finally, a right of appeal is
provided. 102
C.

1975: General Revision of Virginia Criminal Procedure

In 1975, the General Assembly enacted a general revision of all
Virginia criminal procedure; however, the pretrial release reforms
of 1972 and 1973 received only cosmetic changes. The 1975 revision
simply reenacted and renumbered the 1973 statutes, and, in separate statutes, enacted language virtually identical to rule 3A:29. 10 3
It is perhaps confusing that section 19.2-120,1°4 which repeats rule
3A:29's test for admission to bail, does not also mention the availability to other forms of release or the statutory preference given to
personal recognizance and unsecured bond. However, these fundamental principles do appear in section 19.2-123105 where the heart
of the 1973 legislation is now located.1 0 6 Neither section 19.2-120
nor section 19.2-123 expressly provides that the judicial officer
should favor nonfinancial release conditions in those cases where
personal recognizance or unsecured bond, alone, would be insufficient. As previously discussed, the 1966 federal Act, reflecting the
Supreme Court's logic in Griffin v. Illinois, requires the judicial officer to choose in serial fashion from a list of release conditions,
and nonfinancial conditions occupy the top of the list.1 07 The lack
of precision of Virginia law on this point is probably inconsequential because the general spirit of section 19.2-123 suggests that
101. 1973 Va. Acts ch. 485 (§ 19.1-109.5) (current version at

VA. CODE ANN.

§

19.2-126

(Repl. Vol. 1975)).
102. 1973 Va. Acts ch. 485 (§ 19.1-109.3) (current version at VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-124
(Cur. Supp. 1979)).
103. Rule 3A:29 remains in effect; however where the language of the 1975 statutes diverge from the language of the rule, the statutes control. VA. CONST. art. VI § 5; VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-3(D) (Repl. Vol. 1977).
104. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-120 (Cur. Supp. 1979). The factors to consider in fixing terms
of bail, listed in Rule 3A:29, are repeated in VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-121 (Cur. Supp. 1979).
105. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-123 (Cur. Supp. 1979).

106. The Virginia Code also contains numerous specific release provisions which are beyond the scope of this article. Among these are provisions for: the authorization of arresting
officers to grant bail in certain cases, VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-122 (RepL Vol. 1975); release of
a material witness, VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-127 (Repl. Vol. 1975); the use of cash deposit in
lieu of surety, VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-138 (Cur. Supp. 1979); the execution of a recognizance,
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-128, -135, -143 (Repl. Vol. 1975), id. §§ 19.2-135, -143 (Cur. Supp.
1979); release pending appeal, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-319, -322 (Cur. Supp. 1979).
107. 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1976).
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nonfinancial conditions generally should be favored, and that a judicial officer who imposes an onerous financial condition when a
nonfinancial condition would suffice would be abusing his discretion. An interpretation to the contrary invites a Griffin challenge
the one recently raised against the Florida pretrial release
such as
8
10

rule.

The only significant amendment to Virginia release statutes
since the 1975 revision occurred in 1978. Section 19.2-123 was
amended to grant the judicial officer the express authority to impose release conditions designed to assure "good behavior pending
bail" as well as assure appearance at trial.10 9 This change represents a departure from the language of the federal Act which was
the model for section 19.2-123. However, because almost all release
conditions can be interpreted as serving this double purpose, the
1978 amendment will likely have little effect except in extreme
applications. 110
V. FEDERAL PRACTICE UNDER THE 1966 ACT

It should be clear from the preceding sections how closely Virginia statutory release law is modeled on the federal reform. Next,
we consider aspects of pretrial release law which federal authorities
have addressed, but which Virginia authorities have not yet considered. Our focus will be the federal rules of court and case law
interpreting the 1966 Act. The succeeding section assesses the merits of the federal approach in these areas and whether Virginia
could profit by following the federal example.
A.

The Trial Level
If the judicial officer is to tailor the pretrial release conditions to

108. See Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978), rehearingen banc vacat'g.,
557 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1977).
109. 1978 Va. Acts ch. 500. The amendment also added a provision authorizing the judicial officer to "issue a capias or order to show cause why the bond should not be revoked" if
the released person violates any condition of release pursuant to § 19.2-123. Id. This portion
of the amendment adds little to the authority already granted the judicial officer by § 19.2135. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-135 (Cum. Supp. 1979). See also Bisping v. Commonwealth, 218
Va. 753, 240 S.E.2d 956 (1978).
110. See note 35 supra and the discussion of preventive detention at notes 61-77 supra
and accompanying text.
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fit the particular needs of each case-as the 1966 Act envisions-he must obtain adequate information about the defendant.
Federal case law places the duty to investigate the facts on the
11 2
defendant's attorney"" and, to a lesser extent, on the prosecutor.
In the District of Columbia, the District of Columbia Bail Agency,
a publicly funded agency modeled after the Manhattan Bail Project, conducts the investigation and reports its findings along with
a recommendation to the judicial officer.1 s However, participation
by a separate agency does not relieve the defense attorney of the
responsibility to offer the judicial officer a proposed set of release
conditions and alternative conditions if the original proposal is
11 4
rejected.
111. Banks v. United States, 414 F.2d 1150, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Wald & Freed, The
Bail Reform Act of 1966: A Practitioner'sPrimer,52 A.B.A.J. 940, 942 (1966). Frequently,
however, the initial release determination is made prior to the defendant retaining counsel
or having counsel appointed by the court. FED. R. CiM. P. 5 (Notes of Advisory Committee
on 1972 Amendments to Rule). In that situation, the defense attorney, upon accepting the
defendant's case, should investigate the facts prior to seeking reconsideration of the initial
decision or review by a higher authority. 18 U.S.C. § 3146(d) & (e) (1976).
112. Vauss v. United States, 365 F.2d 956, 957 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ("Where 'the government
knows or has the means of knowing... [it] should... assist the court in acquiring such
information.' "), quoting with approval Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
(elipses and brackets by the court).
113. D.C. CODE §§ 23-1301 to -1332 (1973). The Ball Agency explains its procedures as
follows:
The process begins with an interview of the arrestee. In the case of an arrestee
charged with a misdemeanor, and otherwise eligible for release on a citation, the interview will probably be conducted over the telephone from a local police station. For
those not eligible for this form of early release, Agency personnel conduct interviews
either at the Central Cellblock (the overnight holding facility in the Police Department) or the Court Cell block. The interview is initiated with a "Miranda warning,"
explaining the arrestee's rights as well as the potential uses of the information, followed by a series of questions regarding community ties and pending or prior involvement with the criminal justice system. Following the interview an attempt to corroborate or verify the information is made through references provided by the arrestee.
Calls are made, when appropriate, to probation or parole officers. A "criminal history" is compiled using police arrest records, computer inquiries, court and Bail
Agency records.
After the interview and verification process is completed, a recommendation is
made.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BAIL AGENCY, REPORT OF THE D.C. BAIL AGENCY FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 1, 1977 - DECEMBER 31, 1977 at 3-5 (no publication date given) (footnotes omitted).

114. Banks v. United States, 414 F.2d 1150, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v.
Leathers, 412 F.2d 169, 173 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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While federal courts frequently recite that release is favored,115
only one decision has been found which actually assigns the burden of proof to the prosecutor to show the defendant will likely
violate proposed release conditions.""" Apparently, the courts see
no need to concern themselves with such a formalistic point of procedure on an issue which involves the weighing of many factors
and is collateral to the determination of guilt or innocence. 11 Also

the allocation of the burden of proof is less significant where factual accuracy is not disputed. 11 8 The disputed details of the crime
charged against the defendant are largely irrelevant to the release
determination.1 More important are facts indicating the defendant's place of residence, his family and community ties, and his
record for appearing in previous cases. The reported federal cases
suggest that the accuracy of these facts is not regularly disputed.
Instead, at issue is the weight
to be accorded them in predicting
1 20
the defendant's actions.

Hearsay and other evidence which would be inadmissible at the
defendant's trial may be considered by the judicial officer 21 and no
doubt frequently is considered. The 1966 Act envisions that the
defendant will cooperate with the judicial officer and the bail
agency investigator in courts where such agencies operate. The de115. See, e.g., White v. United States, 412 F.2d 145, 147 (D.C. Cir. 1968). See also Wood
v. United States, 391 F.2d 981, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
116. United States v. Edson, 487 F.2d 370, 372 (1st Cir. 1973). Edson does not make clear
whether the court is using the phrase "burden of proof' to mean the burden of producing
the evidence or the burden of persuasion. See D. MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 336 (2d ed. 1972).
117. See generally, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PRETIAL SERVICES AGENCIES, PERFORMANCE
STANDARDS AND GOALS FOR PRETRIAL RELEASE AND DIVERSION: RELEASE IV, B (1978) [herein-

after cited as NAPSA] (providing that the prosecutor should have the burden of proving by
clear and convincing evidence any need for restrictive conditions of release); D.C. CODE §
23-1322(b)(2) (1973) (where defendant is denied release for reasons of preventive detention,
the prosecutor has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant
meets the statutory requirements). While the question of burden of proof in pretrial release
cases has not generated much interest from the courts, in post trial release requests there is
clear authority. FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(c) and FED. R. App. P. 9(c) place the burden on the
defendant seeking release pendng appeal to show that he will not flee or pose a danger.
118. See Note, A HiddenIssue of Sentencing:Burdens of Prooffor Disputed Allegations
in Presentence Reports, 66 GEo. L. J. 1515 (1978).
119. United States v. Alston, 420 F.2d 176, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
120. See note 154 infra.
121. 18 U.S.C. § 3146(0 (1976).
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fendant is the most convenient source of information and, on some
subjects, the only source.' 22 To limit the likelihood of chilling the
defendant's fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination,
the judicial officer is required to inform the defendant of his right
to seek pretrial release and the factors relevant to the release determination. 123 For the same reasons, the judicial officer, the prosecutor, and the bail agency investigator may not use the inquiry to
determine release eligibility as a ruse for interrogating the defendant about the facts underlying the pending charge.12 4 District of
Columbia statutory law provides that any information obtained by
the District of Columbia Bail Agency "shall not be admitted on the
issue of guilt" at the defendant's trial.125 It would follow that an
incriminating statement made by the defendant in the portion of a
pretrial hearing considering pretrial release should likewise be
inadmissible on the issue of guilt or innocence,'126 although there is
127
authority to the contrary.

The point of procedure that has received the most attention is
the requirement, in certain situations, that the judicial officer set
down in writing the reasons for his release determination. The federal Act requires that written reasons be given a defendant who,
after twenty-four hours, is unable to meet the conditions of release
and whose request to have the conditions amended has been denied. 12 Also, rule 9 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
requires the district court to supply reasons for its actions in every
122. E.g., United States v. Cook, 442 F.2d 723 (D.C.. Cir. 1970) (remanding the case so
that the defendant could be asked what amount of bail he could afford).

123.

FED.

R.

CRIM.

P. 5(c).

124. See McCarthy & Wahl, The District of Columbia Bail Project: An Illustration of
Experimentationand a Brief for Change, 53 GEO. L. J. 675, 703 (1965). Accord, NAPSA,
supra note 117, at III, D.
125. D.C. CODE § 23-1303(d) (1973).
126. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968) (defendant who testified in a

pretrial hearing to establish standing to object to allegedly illegally seized evidence may not
have the testimony used against him at trial on the issue of guilt or innocence);
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

UNIFORM

344(e); NAPSA, supra note 117,.at VII, B, 3 (recommending

incriminating statements made during release hearings be inadmissible).
127. United States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 1135 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
958 (1979). The court rejected the defendant's attempt to suppress the statement, inter alia,
because there was no showing that if the defendant had withheld the statement he would
have been denied release. Id.
128. 18 U.S.C. § 3146(d) (1976).
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release determination appealed to the federal court of appeals. 129
Written reasons are probably the most effective assurance that the
judicial officer considers all of the release options available, 130 particularly in light of the expedited nature of the typical release determination.1 31 Also, written reasons assist the appellate court in
properly focusing its review.1 3 2 These protective characteristics
have undoubtedly reduced the pressure on federal judges to compile a long list of other required procedural safeguards. Consequently, the federal release hearing remains a flexible and informal
proceeding.
Federal appellate courts interpreting rule 9 have held that where
a district court denies release, its written reasons must reveal the
legal justification for denial, the supporting evidence, and why no
set of release conditions will reduce these risks to an acceptable
level. 1 33 Where release is granted, and the defendant seeks to have
the conditions of release amended, rule 9 requires the judicial officer to provide reasons why less onerous conditions of release were
13
rejected.
The requirement for written reasons has been generally well received. 3 5 Identical or similar requirements have been incorporated
into the release procedure of fourteen states s and included in sev129. FED. R. App. P. 9(a).
130. See Mecom v. United States, 434 U.S. 1340, 1342 n.4 (1977) (Powell, Circuit Justice);
Weaver v. United States, 405 F.2d 353, 354 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
131. Ervin, supra note 1, at 442-43. See generally 2 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 16.05 (1958).

132. Mecom v. United States, 434 U.S. 1340, 1342 n.4 (1977) (Powell, Circuit Justice);
Weaver v. United States, 405 F.2d 353, 354 (D.C. Cir. 1968); FED. R. App. P. 9, Notes of the

Advisory Committee on Amendments to Rules (Subdivision (a)).
133. Weaver v. United States, 405 F.2d 353, 354 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Weaver concerned the

denial of release pending appeal. See notes 29 and 31 supra and accompanying text (listing
grounds for denial of pretrial release in noncapital cases). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3148 (Supp.
1976) (listing the grounds for denial of post trial release and denial of release in capital
cases).

134. United States v. Estes, 458 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Leathers, 412
F.2d 169, 172 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
135. E.g., Mecom v. United States, 434 U.S. 1340 (1977) (Powell, Circuit Justice).
136. State v. Gary, 247 S.E.2d 420 (W. Va. 1978) (trial court required to provide written
reasons for its action whenever the prosecution opposes the defendant's right to ball or the

amount); In re Podesto, 15 Cal. 3d 921, 938, 544 P.2d 1297, 1307, 127 Cal. Rptr. 97, 107
(1976) (trial court required to provide reasons whenever bail pending appeal is denied);
State v. Roessell, 132 Vt. 634, 328 A.2d 118, 119 (1974) (hearing and reviewing judges re-
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eral model codes. 137 There is even a line of cases holding written
reasons to be such an effective procedural safeguard against arbitrariness that the fourteenth amendment requires judicial officers
in state proceedings to submit their reasons whenever release is
denied."" 8 However, another line of cases, while conceding the
value of the written reasons, holds that they are not required by
the constitution so long as general fairness is observed."3 '
B.

The Appellate Level

All orders by the federal district court "refusing or imposing
conditions of release" may be appealed to the court of appeals and
"shall be determined promptly.

1 40

There is no necessity for formal

briefs, and the appeals court is free to consider "such papers, affi141
davits and portions of the record as the parties shall present.

Rule 17(d) and (e) of the Rules of Court for the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia lists the types of
factual material that the court normally finds helpful. 142 The apquired to record factual findings upon which decisions were based); TENN. R. APP. P. 8 (defendant has right to written reasons for any release determination appealed to the Supreme
Court of Tennessee). Other states have provisions modeled after § 3146(d) requiring the
judicial officer who made the initial release determination to submit written reasons if, upon
reconsideration, he does not modify the conditions of release and the defendant remains
detained. ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020(f) (Cum. Supp. 1979); IOWA CODE ANN. § 811.2(3) (Repl.
Vol. 1979); Ky. R. CRIM. P. 4.40(2); MD. DIST. CT. R. 721(f); MICH. GEN. CT. R. 790.5; NEB.
REV. STAT. § 29-901.03 (Repl. Vol. 1975); N.M. R. CRIM. 'P. DIST. CT. 22(e); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 23A-43-8 (Special Supp. 1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 969.08 (Cum. Supp. 1979);
Wyo. R. CRIM. P. 8(c)(4) (1979). Accord, D.C. CODE § 23-1321(d) (1973).
137.

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMI-

Ch. 10, Pretrial Release 10-5.1(d) (2d ed. tentative draft 1978, approved by
ABA House of Delegates, Feb. 12, 1979); NAPSA, supra note 117, at IV, D; NATIONAL ADvISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GoALs, CORRECTIONS 4.5(3)(c) (1973).
NAL JUSTICE,

138. Finetti v. Harris, 460 F. Supp. 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Flowers v. Greco, 445 F. Supp.

979 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated on other grounds, 582 F.2d 1271 (2d Cir. 1978); Abbott v. Laurie,
422 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I. 1976); United States ex rel. Abate v. Malcolm, 397 F. Supp. 715
(E.D.N.Y.), vacated as moot, 522 F.2d 826 (2d Cir. 1975); United States ex rel. Bad Heart
Bull v. Parkinson, 381 F. Supp. 985 (D.S.D.), enforced in 385 F. Supp. 1265 (D.S.D. 1974);
United States ex rel. Keating v. Bensinger, 322 F. Supp. 784 (N. D. Ill. 1971).
139. United States ex rel. Smith v. Twomey, 486 F.2d 736, 739 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 994 (1974); United States ex rel. Walker v. Twomey, 484 F.2d 874 (7th Cir.
1973); Brown v. Wilmot, 443 F. Supp. 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), afl'd on other grounds, 572 F.2d
404 (2d Cir. 1978); Natal v. People of Puerto Rico, 424 F. Supp. 1082 (D.P.R. 1975).
140. FED. R. App. P. 9(a).
141. Id.
142. The D.C. rule suggests that the following facts, if deemed relevant by the defendant,
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peals court may consider evidence not presented to the trial
court. 143 Of course, if the factual accuracy of the new evidence is
disputed, the appeals court may remand the case for further consideration below.144 Most of the federal appellate court decisions
concerning release are made without the benefit of oral
argument.

145

Before the reforms of the mid-1960's and early 1970's, both federal and state appellate courts regularly gave great deference to the
release determination made by the trial judge. 46 The 1966 Act altered this practice, as far as federal courts are concerned, by giving
appellate judges a ready statutory reference for determining
whether the trial judge has abused his discretion. The Act provides
that the trial judge's determination will be upheld only if "supported by the proceedings below." 4 7 'Notwithstanding some early
indications that this standard of review would be no more strict
than the former practice, 4 8 federal appellate judges now regularly
assert an authority "to make an independent determination of all
relevant factors' ' 49 deferring to the trial judge only "when deference is due."' 150 Most clearly, deference is not due a trial judge's
be included in the pleadings filed with the court of appeals: (1) the charge against the defendant, (2) the history of the bail application in the lower court, (3) the defendant's date and
place of birth, and a list of the defendant's places of residence for the last five years, (4) the
defendant's marital and employment status, (5) the names of local relatives or other persons
who are close to the defendant, (6) the defendant's criminal record and record for appearing
for trial, (7) the defendant's probation or parole record, (8) the defendant's health, (9) the
defendant's means of support and plans if released, (10) the defendant's financial ability to
post bond, and (11) any other pertinent matters. D.C. CIR. R. 17(d) & (e).
143. See, e.g., United States v. Bobrow, 468 F.2d 124, 126, n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
144. See note 160 infra and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., D.C. CIR. R. 17(d); 5TH CIR. R. 10.2.10 & 10.3.
146. Foote, supra note 2, at 1130-31 and the cases cited therein.
147. 18 U.S.C. § 3147(b) (1976).
148. Allen v. United States, 386 F.2d 634 (D.C. Cir. 1967); United States v. Blyther, 295
F. Supp. 1088 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 407 F.2d 1279 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 953 (1969)
(compare the comments of District Judge Gesell in 295 F. Supp. at 1090 with the comments
of Senior Circuit Judge Fahy in 407 F.2d at 1280).
149. United States v. Stanley, 469 F.2d 576, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (quoting Hansford v.
United States, 353 F.2d 858, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1965)). Cf. Truong Dinh Hung v. United States,
439 U.S. 1326, 1328 (1978) (Brennan, Circuit Justice) (Supreme Court Justices, when sitting
as circuit justices reviewing bail issues, also exercise independent judgment).
150. United States v. Jackson, 417 F.2d 1154, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Accord, United
States v. Stanley, 469 F.2d 576, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Weaver v. United States, 405 F.2d 353,
354 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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determination if it is not accompanied by a statement of reasons.1 5 ' Nor is deference due a trial judge's determination if the
reasons indicate that no consideration was given to less onerous
conditions15 2 or relevant facts such as the defendant's record for
appearing for trial in previous cases. 153 Even where these requirements are met, the appellate court may find fault with the trial
judge for improperly weighing the evidence before him.154 The
rebalancing technique quite properly allows an appellate court to
correct a result which is grossly inconsistent with the spirit of the
1966 Act favoring release. 55 On the other hand, in close cases appellate judges often cannot agree about the propriety of rebalanc15 6
ing the evidence to overrule the decision of the trial judge.
151. See notes 133-34 supra and accompanying text.
152. Id.
153. Wood v. United States, 391 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
154. Truong Dinh Hung v. United States, 439 U.S. 1326 (1978) (Brennan, Circuit Justice)
(trial judge erroneously denied release pending appeal because he equated opportunities to
flee with intent to flee); United States v. Edson, 487 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1973) (Following
reversal of defendant's conviction, the defendant sought release pending a new trial. In setting release conditions, the trial court erred in not giving sufficient weight to the defendant's
superior record as a prisoner and the likelihood that, if reconvicted, the defendant would
receive a shorter sentence.); United States v. Honeyman, 470 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1972) (trial
judge exaggerated the importance of the evidence of the defendant's guilt and disregarded
the defendant's record for appearing at trial); United States v. Cramer, 451 F.2d 1198, 1200
(5th Cir. 1971) (trial judge set onerous release conditions to prevent defendant from associating with "fast company," rather than to assure appearance at trial); United States v. Alston, 420 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (trial judge over-emphasized the evidence of guilt, the
defendant's prior convictions and the likelihood of a long sentence); United States v. Forrest, 418 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (trial judge erroneously denied release pending appeal
because he exaggerated the importance of the defendant's prior convictions and minimized
the importance of the defendant's opportunity for employment); Banks v. United States,
414 F.2d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (trial judge erroneously denied release pending appeal by
discounting the likely effectiveness of conditions designed to minimize danger to the community); White v. United States, 412 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (trial judge erroneously denied pretrial release to defendant charged with capital offense because defendant's lack of
prior criminal record, his strong community roots, and voluntary surrender to police were
not given sufficient weight); United States v. Harrison, 405 F.2d 355 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (trial
judge erroneously denied release pending appeal because he underestimated the importance
of the defendant's record for appearance, his ties to the community, and conduct in prison).
On rare occasions, appellate courts have rebalanced the evidence to deny release which had
been granted by the trial court. Chapman v. United States, 408 F.2d 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
Russell v. United States, 402 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
155. E.g., United States v. Edson, 487 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1973); United States v. Cramer,
451 F.2d 1198 (5th Cir. 1971).
156. United States v. Forrest, 418 F.2d 1186, 1188, (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Robb, J., dissenting);
Banks v. United States, 414 F.2d 1150, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Leventhal, J., dissenting);
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Once error has been shown, a federal appellate court has statutory authority to remand the case for further hearings before the
trial judge or it may set the conditions for release. 157 Appellate
courts frequently characterize this latter option as acting de
novo.158 The rule, announced in United States v. Stanley, 59 is that
there isno need to remand where relevant facts are "clear enough
to lead convincingly to but one conclusion." 8 0 Extreme cases, such
as where the trial judge neglects to state any reasons for his release
determination, are the most obvious candidates for remand.' 8 '
However, since Weaver v. United States,'6 2 the more common situation is for the trial judge to submit at least some factual findings
and conclusions of law. In such cases,' 3 whether the appellate
court should act de novo or remand for the trial judge's further
consideration depends on the likelihood that either the trial judge,
if given another chance, will uncover better information than that
already in the record' 4 or that his further analysis will be more
White v. United States, 412 F.2d 145, 147 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Danaher, J., dissenting). See
also United States v. Wright, 483 F.2d 1068 (4th Cir. 1973) (the two majority judges defer to
the trial judge's decision while Judge Winter, in dissent, would rebalance to reach a different result).
157. 18 U.S.C. § 3147(b) (1976).
158. E.g., United States v. Stanley, 469 F.2d 576, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v.
Blyther, 407 F.2d 1279, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Russell v. United States, 402 F.2d 185, 186
(D.C. Cir. 1968).
159. 469 F.2d 576 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
160. Id. at 585.
161. United States v. Briggs, 472 F.2d 1229 (5th Cir. 1973); Weaver v. United States, 405
F.2d 353 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Cf. Mecom v. United States, 434 U.S. 1340 (1977) (Powell, Circuit
Justice). (Even though no written reasons were submitted, Circuit Justice Powell ruled on
the merits because he obtained the lower court's reasoning from the government's pleadings.). The judicial officer's reasons may be stated orally and transcribed in the record.
United States v. Cramer, 451 F.2d 1198 (5th Cir. 1971). Cf. United States v. Fields, 466 F.2d
119, 121 (2d Cir. 1972) (oral reasons were not sufficiently specific); United States v.
Manarite, 430 F.2d 656, 657 (2d Cir. 1970) ("[W]e do not consider extensive colloquy without any definite statement in conclusion to be in accordance with the Rule.").
162. 405 F.2d 353 (D.C. Cir. 1968). See note 133 supra and accompanying text.
163. United States v. Stanley, 469 F.2d 576 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Jackson,
417 F.2d 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Banks v. United States, 414 F.2d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
Chapman v. United States, 408 F.2d 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
164. Where the case has been remanded once before and the trial judge failed to correct
his orginal error or otherwise comply with the appellate court's instruction, the appellate
court will be more inclined to act de novo when considering the record appeal. United States
v. Alston, 420 F.2d 176, 177-78 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Banks v. United States, 414 F.2d 1150, 1154
(D.C. Cir. 1969).
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reliable than the appellate court's own. One school of thought is
that the trial judge's analysis carries the most force when the trial
judge has had an opportunity to observe the defendant's demeanor,16 though this theory has been criticized.1 66 Another factor
to be considered is that remand can mean delay, sometimes extreme delay,167 which in the context of a pretrial release determination is almost tantamount to denying all relief. 6 "
VI.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Clearly two of the points of federal release procedure just summarized-placing the primary responsibility on the defense counsel
to investigate the facts and to recommend conditions of release,
and the relaxation of the rules of evidence-are suggested by common sense more than anything else, and have probably been the
regular practice in Virginia courts even though Virginia law makes
no explicit provisions containing them. On the other hand, no federal court has definitively addressed the controversial question of
whether to admit into evidence an incriminating statement made
by the defendant while seeking pretrial release. The authorities
who have considered this issue offer conflicting solutions. The issue
will undoubtedly receive more attention in the future. In order to
obtain the benefits of the 1966 Act, the defendant, either directly
or through other persons, must supply considerable personal information. Even when the judicial officer and other court personnel
do not purposely seek facts surrounding the pending charge, questions seemingly irrelevant to the charge may sometimes produce
relevant answers. As far as appellate procedure is concerned, the
check list of information to include on appeal, provided in the
rules for the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, is
165. United States v. Stanley, 469 F.2d 576, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
166. Id. at 590 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
167. The defendant in Banks v. United States, 414 F.2d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1969) appealed
the trial court's denial of a motion for release pending appeal and the appellate court remanded the case with instructions. The trial court again denied release and the defendant
appealed a second time. The appellate court acted de novo and set conditions of release;
however, five months elapsed between the remand order and the eventual setting of release
conditions. United States v. Stanley, 469 F.2d 576, 590 n.7 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
168. Judge Robinson, writing the majority opinion in Stanley, suggests that appellate
courts can minimize the opportunity for delay by placing time limitations on remand orders.
469 F.2d at 588 n.65.
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another example of a common sense approach that could easily
serve as a model for seeking review from the Supreme Court of
Virginia.
The most significant and innovative point of procedure, described in the preceding section, is the requirement that the trial
judge submit written reasons supporting a release determination
whenever the determination is appealed to the court of appeals. In
return for the modest amount of time and attention required for
the trial judge to put his reasons to paper, the defendant is provided a written indication of whether his rights are being observed.
The trial judge's statements serve as the focal point for identifying
the evidence he deemed to be relevant and worthy of belief. More
importantly, the federal appellate courts insist that the reasons
also reveal why less onerous conditions of release were rejected. In
other requests for appellate review, this sort of protection is afforded by the written record. The appeal of a pretrial release determination, however, comes early in the proceeding. The written
record, if it exists at all, is likely to be short and cryptic, 169 and
therefore of little value in resolving the allegations and counterallegations contained in the pleadings. 170
The authority to elicit explanations why less onerous conditions
were rejected has been the federal appellate court's primary- resource for spurring lower courts to put into practice the reform
measures of the 1966 Act. 171 Since 1973, Virginia statutory law has
clearly favored two of the Act's reform measures-release on personal recognizance and release pursuant to nonfinancial conditions.
But there are no reported decisions by the Supreme Court of Virginia encouraging their use. 172 Even assuming that the Virginia
169. See State v. Roessell, 132 Vt. 634, 635, 328 A.2d 118, 119 (1974).
170. "Without the settling effect of a reasoned treatment of the relevant information by

the judge, we are apt to confront 'a welter of assertion and counter-assertion [by the parties]
... from which we have no adequate means of emerging."' United States v. Stanley, 469

F.2d 576, 583 (D.C. Cir. 1972), quoting United States v. Hansel, 109 F.2d 613, 614 (2d Cir.
1940) (ellipsis and brackets by the court).
171. E.g., Weaver v. United States, 405 F.2d 353 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
172. Shortly after the 1973 legislation enacting these reform measures became effective, a
newspaper survey of Northern Virginia counties found that judges continued to place tradi-

tional financial conditions on release in most cases. Washington Post, Aug. 30, 1973, § B, at
1, col. 5.
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court's unreported decisions17 3 require trial judges to consider
these forms of release, it cannot be doubted that they would receive fuller consideration if Virginia trial judges, in certain cases,
were required to support their determinations with reasons.
I propose that either the Supreme Court of Virginia, by amendment to rule 3A:29, or the General Assembly, by amendment to
section 19.2-124,17 require circuit judges to supply written reasons
supporting the release determination whenever the issue of release
75
is appealed to the state supreme court or to one of its justices.1
This change would in no way make the Virginia test for release
eligibility any less restrictive. It would simply provide the state's
highest court with a tried and tested tool for revealing whether circuit judges are properly applying the test. The responsibility of the
Supreme Court of Virginia to give full attention to these appeals is
greater than that of comparable courts in other states where intermediate appellate courts handle much of the case load. Nor should
it be forgotten that a growing line of cases holds that the Constitution requires state courts to submit written reasons whenever release is denied. 76
By limiting the written reasons requirement to determinations
that are being appealed, there would be no increased burden on
circuit court judges in the majority of cases. 77 The Supreme Court
173. See note 12 supra.
174. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-124 (Cum. Supp. 1979), setting forth the defendant's right to
appeal his release determination to successively higher judges "including the Supreme Court
of Virginia or any justice thereof."
175. The initial release determination is usually made by a magistrate or a district judge,
and comes before the circuit court on interlocutory appeal. VA. Sup. CT. R. 3A:5, :29(c). The
circuit court also has jurisdiction over release matters in all criminal cases coming before it
for trial. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-130 (Cum. Supp. 1979); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-133 (Repl. Vol.
1975). Because the circuit court has ready access to the same information about the defendant that the magistrate and or the district judge relied on, the circuit court's need for
written reasons is less than that of the Supreme Court of Virginia.
176. See note 138 supra.
177. As a less drastic alternative to the proposal contained in the text, the law could be
changed to require written reasons only when release is actually denied and not when the
defendant complains that his conditions of release are onerous. This alternative proposal
would benefit those defendants receiving the trial judge's most severe sanction. However,
the proposal in the text is preferable because a defendant who is denied release and a defendant who is granted release but unable to meet the conditions of release both suffer the
same prejudice.
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of Virginia has traditionally given trial judges great discretion in
release matters.'71 This policy could be continued in a slightly
modified form. The justices could use the written reasons to hold
the trial judge strictly accountable for considering all relevant evidence and available conditions of release, but defer to the trial
judge's evaluation of the risks involved in close cases.17 As a collateral benefit, the Supreme Court may find, as the federal appellate courts have, that having the issues laid out in pleadings by the
defendant and the prosecutor, supplemented by the trial judge's
reasons, normally renders oral presentation unnecessary. Thereby,
another potential source of delay would be eliminated.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Regrettably, all release determinations are attempts to predict
the future. Consequently, an element of risk is unavoidable. 180 The
bail reform movement has demonstrated that personal recognizance, nonfinancial conditions, and ten percent deposit plans are
reliable techniques for reducing this risk to an acceptable level.
The Supreme Court of Virginia and the General Assembly have
already decided to pattern Virginia release law on the 1966 federal
reform. This forward-looking decision brought Virginia law in general conformity with a reform act that still enjoys wide approval.
The federal reform act requires judges to consider numerous factors about the defendant and numerous release options. The principal procedural safeguard assuring that the trial judge properly
follows this intricate process is the requirement that he submit
written reasons supporting all release determinations appealed to
the appellate court. The same procedural safeguard should be
available to Virginia defendants.

178. See Jordan v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 591, 601, 151 S.E.2d 390, 397 (1966) (upholding the setting of bail pending appeal at $10,000 as within the trial judge's discretion).
179. The federal appellate courts have not been consistent in their handling of close
cases. See note 156 supra.
180. Ward v. United States, 76 S. Ct. 1063, 1066 (1956) (Frankfurter, Circuit Justice);
United States v. Alston, 420 F.2d 176, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1969).

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND

LAW REVIEW
1980

SPRING

VOLUME 14

NUMBER

EDITORIAL BOARD
JOHN D. Epps
Editor-in-Chief
ROBERT

T.

BILLINGSLEY

Executive Editor
WILLIAM

A.

DIAMOND

Manuscripts Editor
KEITH BARKER

Articles Editor
A. FLOURNOY
Comments Editor

JOHN R. WALK

ELIZABETH

Notes Editor

ASSOCIATE EDITORS
THOMAS E. BARWICK
STEPHEN L. DALTON
JOAN M. FITZPATRICK
WARD

HOWARD E. HILL
NATHAN A. NELSON, JR.
WILLIAM C. WADDELL III

L.

ARMSTRONG

Managing Editor
STAFF
ANN ANNASE
GARY A. BASKIN
ANN R. BERGAN
KENNETH E. CHADWICK
MARY G. COMMANDER
BARBARA A. DALVANO
E. SUZANNE DARLING
PATRICK C. DEVINE, JR.
R. CRAIG EVANS
W. F. DREWRY GALLALEE
EVERETT M. GABER HI
ELIZABETH C. GAY
MARLENE F. GIBBONS
C. THOMAS GREEN III

JANICE M. HAMILTON
TIMOTHY H. HANKINS
HUGH T. HARRISON II
J. PHILIP HART
THOMAS G. HASKINS
JANINE S. HILLER
DONNA J. KATOS
KEVIN B. LYNCH
SCOTT A. MILBURN
JENNIE L. MONTGOMERY

JOYCE A. NAUMANN
WALTER H. OHAR
BARREr E. POPE

LINDA F. RIGSBY
STEPHEN R. ROMINE
BARBARA M. ROSE
JOHN P. ROWLEY IH
ELIZABETH C. SHUFF
RICHARD L. SISISKY
BARBARA H. VANN
BERNARD S. VIA 1H
MICHAEL J. VISCOUNT, JR.
BEVERLY J. WARNER
BRUCE W. WHITE
MELISSA A. WOOD
SALLY Y. WOOD

FACULTY ADVISOR
RONALD

J. BACIGAL

ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT
JUDITH H. HARRELL

3

